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POST-FORECLOSURE STATUTORY RIGHT OF REDEMPTION
UNDER CHAPTER 13 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE:
A BALANCE OF STATE AND FEDERAL INTERESTS
I. INTRODUCTION

This note addresses the narrow issue of whether a state statutory right
of redemption in favor of a mortgagor or junior lien holder survives the
filing of a petition under Chapter 13 of Title 11, United States Code (the
Bankruptcy Code).' The circuits that have addressed the role of the
statutory right of redemption under the Bankruptcy Code have had

difficulty giving the proper weight to the state property interest vis-a-vis
the right to cure mortgage defaults under the Bankruptcy Code.
This note demonstrates that the statutory right of redemption 2
establishes the debtor's initial property interest, which, following a petition
under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, becomes property of the

bankrupt estate. 3 Under Chapter 13, the debtor has a right to cure any
default in real property that is the debtor's principal residence.' As long
as the debtor retains an interest in the principal residence properly created
under state law at the time of the petition for protection under Chapter 13,

the debtor may cure the default and reinstate the mortgage. Although the
initial interest in the property must be determined by state law, state

mortgage law cannot limit the scope of the federal right to cure unless that
cure power is expressly limited under federal law. Therefore, the cure
© Copyright 1993 by the New York Law School Law Review.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 18-21.
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988). Section 541 broadly sweeps all debtor property
interests into the estate, encompassing "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the case." Id. § 541(a)(1); see also id. § 1306
(incorporating § 541 directly, and further expanding its reach); In re Thompson, 894
F.2d 1227, 1229 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[A] mortgage debtor must have some legal or
equitable interest in property which enters the bankruptcy estate if he hopes to retain it
through the bankruptcy cure provisions."); In re Ivory, 32 B.R. 788, 791 (Bankr. D. Or.
1983) ("[lt is clear that a debtor retains an interest in the property until the statutory
redemption period has run and legal title has passed.").
4. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), (b)(5).
5. "State law" refers to the property laws of the individual states as opposed to
federal law encompassed in the Bankruptcy Code, including the right to cure arrearages
in the debtor's principal residence available under the Code. See generally Butner v.
United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1975) (holding that the Bankruptcy Code leaves the
determination of property rights in assets to state law).
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right under § 1322(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code should be applied to the
post-foreclosure statutory right of redemption as well as any other statecreated property right. This interpretation is supported by the broad
language of § 1322(b)(5), 6 the policy underlying Chapter 13, 7 and the
lack of support in the legislative history evidencing Congress's intent to
limit the right to cure at any point along the default and foreclosure
process."
The state statutory right of redemption creates a property interest in
favor of the defaulting homeowner, that is, the right to redeem the
homestead following foreclosure and sale.9 A federal right providing "for
the curing of any default" under § 1322(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code
comes into existence following a voluntary, involuntary, or joint filing. 10
A collision of the state-based property rights with the constitutionally
mandated federal bankruptcy powers" provides a classic example of how
the bankruptcy and circuit courts address a fundamental interaction
between traditional state and federal rights. Once the interest in the
debtor's principal residence is established under state law and has been
filed under the Bankruptcy Code, that interest comes into the estate and
is capable of "cure" as provided in the Bankruptcy Code.12 State
mortgage and foreclosure laws that attempt to limit that right must fail.
Part II of this note is an amalgam of fact patterns in Chapter 13 cases
on this issue, exemplifying the typical dilemma faced by the unwary
homeowner. Part Ill.A reviews the state property law relative to
mortgages and foreclosures. Part lI1.B reviews the applicable Bankruptcy
Code provisions. Part I.C compares the operation of both spheres. Part
IV reviews the approaches taken in recent court decisions to extinguish the
state-based right of redemption.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 34-40, 58.

7. See infra part mI.B.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 40-42, 60.

9. See infra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (voluntary filings); id. § 302 (joint filings); id. § 303
(involuntary filings).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o
establish... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (defining property of the estate); id. § 1306 (defining

property of the estate).
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II. A HOMEOWNER'S HOBSON'S CHOICE
The Paytons purchased a home, obtaining a loan and a mortgage from
the local bank. When the house burned down, the Paytons, unable to
continue timely payments due to additional living expenses and the
confusion following the loss of their home, subsequently defaulted on the
mortgage. During negotiations with the insurance company, which took
longer than they had anticipated, the house was sold at the foreclosure
auction. The mortgagee was the only bidder and purchased the home for
the value of its mortgage.
The Paytons, with no place to live, met with an attorney who advised
them to file a petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. The state
in which their former home is located has a one-year statutory right of
redemption, and the attorney explained that this state statute provided a
legal right to redeem, or buy back, their home within one year following
the sale. The attorney then filed a reorganization plan, which provided for
payment in full of all arrearages and reinstatement of the original
mortgage payments. The insurance company meanwhile settled the claim,
and the forthcoming proceeds were to fund the plan.
Should the bankruptcy court approve the plan and allow the Paytons
to rebuild their house, or has the sale "cut off" the state right to redeem
once protection under the federal scheme has been invoked?
III. THE BASIC FRAMEWORK
A. State Law
State procedures for the treatment of the homeowner following default
and leading up to foreclosure sale are lengthy and are not uniform in all
states.13 Common points along the spectrum are the event of default,
13.

A typical action in equity to foreclose and sell involves a long series
of steps: a preliminary title search to determine all parties in interest;
filing of the foreclosure bill of complaint and lis pendens notice;
service of process; a hearing, usually by a master in chancery who
then reports to the court; the decree or judgment; notice of sale;
actual sale and the issuance of certificate of sale; report of the sale;
proceedings for determination of the right to any surplus; possible
redemptions from foreclosure sale; and the entry of a decrec for a
deficiency.

Douglas A. Winthrop, Note, The Chapter13 Cure Provisions:A Doctrinein Need of a
Cure, 74 MNN. L. REv. 921, 922 n.9 (1990) (citation omitted).
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acceleration of the obligation under the note accompanying the mortgage,
state court foreclosure judgment, and foreclosure sale. 4

Under the real-property law of all states, a mortgagor is entitled to
exercise an "equitable right of redemption" following default on a
mortgage of real property."5 This redemption right is the "mortgagor's
right after default in every jurisdiction, title, lien or intermediate, to
perform his obligation under the mortgage and have the title to his

property restored free and clear of the mortgage."16 Notwithstanding
contrary language in the mortgage documents, the mortgagor and junior
encumbrancers
have an implied right to redeem the property prior to
17
foreclosure.
Foreclosure was the point established at common law to cut off or
"foreclose" the mortgagor's equity of redemption. "8Due to the potential

abuses and hardship to mortgagors faced with a forced sale and potentially
large deficiency judgments, a majority of states have provided a "statutory
right of redemption." 'I The purpose of this state-created right is to allow
the mortgagor and junior lienors, in order of seniority, to redeem the

propertyfollowing the foreclosure sale for a specified period of time at the
sale price plus costs and interest."°

The statutory right to redeem can extend up to two years. 21 This

homeowners' right is meant to encourage bidding at the foreclosure sale
and discourage sharp practices, such as rigged bidding,' because
14. See id. at 921-22.
15. GRAN S. NELSON &DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATEFINANCE LAW § 7.1,
at 478 (2d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1989).
16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. See id. at 478-79.
18. RobertK. Lifton, Real Estate in Trouble:Lender'sRemediesNeed an Overhaul,
31 Bus. LAW. 1927, 1936 (1976).
19. Id. at 1938-39; see also NESON & WHnMAN, supra note 15, § 7.1, at 479
(providing a brief description of statutory redemption).
20. See Lifton, supra note 18, at 1938-39.
21. ALLAN AXELROD Er AL., LAND TRANsFER AND FINANCE 296 (3d ed. 1986 &
Supp. 1991).
22. Lifton, supra note 18, at 1939 ("These statutes are intended as a threat to force
the mortgagee and other potential bidders to bid the full value of the property on the
foreclosure sale in order to preclude the owner from later seeking to redeem the property
at the below-market sales price.").
23. Also referred to as "chilled" bidding, this practice involves locking up potential
bidders to allow a below-market foreclosure sale to conclude. See generally Manoog v.
Miele, 213 N.E.2d 917 (Mass. 1966) (allowing a mortgagee to contract with a potential
buyer before the sale at a fixed price). The Manoog court noted that a "knowledgeable
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unusually low purchase prices would encourage mortgagors to exercise

their rights and redeem their property. There is considerable debate
concerning the effectiveness of the statutory right of redemption.'
Even in a state providing a post-foreclosure sale redemption right,
defaulting homeowners may be unable to redeem due to the requirement

that the foreclosure sale price plus expenses must be paid in full at
redemption.' A homeowner most likely would have redeemed during the

equitable period if refinancing was possible or additional funds were
forthcoming. The function of the statutory right, as opposed to the
equitable right to redeem, may be limited to its ability to encourage
bidding because it is a rare turn of events that brings sufficient money to
a foreclosed debtor to repay the mortgage debt plus costs. One type of
situation in which the statutory right may be used for its redemption value

is when insurance proceeds are forthcoming, but not soon enough to
forestall a foreclosure sale.
An alternative to redemption under state law is filing a petition under
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, under which the accelerated defaulted

mortgage can be decelerated, reinstated, and the arrearage "cured."'
B. FederalLaw

The Bankruptcy Code?' permits a debtor to stay creditor activity and
allows the bankruptcy court to collect into the estate all property in which
the debtor holds an equitable or legal title.' The Bankruptcy Code
promotes creditor equality by permitting consensual plans of
reorganization, but insures that dissenting classes of creditors are treated
mortgagee should not be allowed to assume a position such that he preempts the field of
bidders and discourages other potential bidders at a sale." Id. at 920. The court focused
on the unavailability of similar financing, which permitted the bidder to expect a better
price than the price at auction from the eventual buyer. Id.
24. Compare United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 365 (9th
Cir. 1970) (majority "not convinced" that statutory right of redemption accomplishes
purpose of forcing full market price at sale) with United States v. Ellis, 714 F.2d 953,
956 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Statutory rights of redemption give the mortgagor power to force
the sale price closer to true market value.").
25. AXELROD ElT AL., supra note 21, at 297; NELSON & WHrrMAN, supranote 15,

§ 7.3, at 481-83.
26. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (describing methods of adjusting debts
of a person with a regular income); infra notes 27-42 and accompanying text (describing
relief under the "cure" provisions in § 1322(b)(5)).
27. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
28. See generally id. § 362 (providing an automatic stay upon filing); id. § 541
(collecting all legal or equitable interests of the debtor into the estate).
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fairly and equitably-avoiding a rush to the state courthouse to obtain and

collect judgments.'

The Bankruptcy Code establishes a collective

proceeding by which debtor rehabilitation can be balanced with the best
interests of all the creditors.'

Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code provides relief to wage earners
who qualify under § 109(e).3 1 The primary beneficiaries of Chapter 13
are homeowners who would be able to retain ownership of their principal
residence under a plan of reorganization.32

The benefit to the debtor of developing a plan of repayment under
chapter 13, rather than opting for liquidation under chapter 7, is
that it permits the debtor to protect his assets. In a liquidation
case, the debtor must surrender his nonexempt assets for
liquidation and sale by the trustee. Under chapter 13, the debtor

may retain his property by agreeing to repay his creditors. 3

Section 1322(b)(5) allows qualifying debtors to cure defaults on long-term
debt, such as mortgage debt.'

Under Bankruptcy Code § 1322(b)(2), the reorganization plan may
modify a secured claim,35 but not one that is secured by real property
29. See, e.g., id. § 362 (noting that at the filing of a bankruptcy petition, an
automatic stay against creditor activity comes into effect); id. § 1129(b)(1) (requiring that
a debtor using the "cramdown" provision against a creditor must propose a plan that,
among other things, does "not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable").
30. See, e.g., id. § 1325(a)(4) (stating that the value of the property distributed
under the plan cannot be less than the amount paid under a Chapter 7 liquidation); see
also id. § 1129(a)(7) (describing the "best interests of the creditors" test for confirmation
of a Chapter 11 plan).
31. "Only an individual with regular income that owes, on the date of the filing of
the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than $100,000 and
noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than $350,000, or an individual with
regular income. .. ." Id. § 109(e).
32. "Section 1322(b)(5) is concerned with relatively long term debt, such as a
security interest or mortgage debt on the residence of the debtor.., its most common
use by far is to cure defaults on residential mortgages." 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrCY
1322.091] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1993).
33. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N., 5787, 6079. An individual may also file under Chapter 11. See Toibb
v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197, 2202 (1991).
34. 5 COLLER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 32, 1322.091].
35. A "claim" is broadly defined as any "right to payment, whether or not such
right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured." 11 U.S.C.
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that is the debtor's principal residence.' The lender's secured interest is
protected against unconsented modification, protecting mortgagees and
consequently the mortgage market.37 Nevertheless, a claim secured by
the debtor's principal residence may be "cured" under § 1322(b)(5).

Section 1322(b)(5) provides for the "curing of any default within a

reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case is pending on

any unsecured claims or secured claim on which the last payment is due
after the date on which the final payment under the plan is due. ""
The timing of the cure was not addressed in the Congressional Record
discussing the "cure" provisions in § 1322(b)(5).' "Our problem is that

we have little help from the words of the statute or its legislative history,
so we must try to reconcile the policies of section 1322(b) and state
mortgage foreclosure law.'41 Indeed, congressional silence as to the point
after which the timing cure can no longer be applied, whether after the
§ 101(5)(A). A secured claim arises as the result of a perfected security interest or
agreement or judicial lien. A security interest is defined under the Code as a "lien
created by agreement." Id. § 101(45).
36. Section 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code states:
(b) Subject to subsection (a) and (c) of this section, the plan may...
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured
only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal
residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of
holders of any class of claims ....
Id. § 1322(b)(2).
37. Undersecured claims may be bifurcated, and the unsecured portion modified.
Id. § 506(a). See, e.g., Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d
Cir. 1990) (agreeing with the Ninth Circuit to allow bifurcation of unsecured claims); In
re Hougland, 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a creditor's rights under
unsecured claims could be modified after bifurcation). The Bankruptcy Court in In re
Richards, 151 B.R. 8 (Bankr. D. Mass., 1993), held that Chapter 13 debtors may use
§ 506 to bifurcate home mortgages and "strip down" the undersecured portion. See id.
at 12; see also In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that Chapter 13
debtor could bifurcate creditor's claim when claim was secured solely by interest in
debtor's principal residence under § 506(a)). But see Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773
(1992) (holding that Chapter 7 debtor could not "strip down" lien under § 506(d)).
38. Bankruptcy Code § 1322(b)(5) begins with "notwithstanding paragraph (2) of
this subsection." 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5).
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. See In re Glenn, 760 F.2d 1428, 1432 (6th Cir. 1985) ("The legislative history
of section 1322(b) is ambiguous about the scope of the right afforded the debtor to cure
a mortgage default."); Winthrop, supra note 13, at 928 ("Unfortunately, neither the
Commission nor the Congress addressed the relationship between the cure provisions of
section 1322(b)(5) and the various stages of foreclosure.").
41. In re Thompson, 894 F.2d 1227, 1230 (10th Cir. 1990).
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event of default, acceleration, judgment, or foreclosure, is the source of
the confusion in the bankruptcy and appellate-level courts.42
C. Conflict or Accommodation
While the Bankruptcy Code governs the ordering of rights to, and
disposition of, property of the estate, a basic premise pervades the
interaction between state and federal law: absent a conflict between state
property and federal bankruptcy law, state law governs questions of

property rights.'
Property rights are created and defined by state law. Unless some
federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why
such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an
interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Uniform
treatment of property interests by both State and federal courts
within a state serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum
shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving "a windfall
merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy."'
The Thompson court noted that no court has asserted that the debtor
retains an interest in the property following the foreclosure sale if the state
does not provide a statutory right of redemption.' But, if the state does
provide a period of time following sale to exercise a redemption right, the
bankruptcy courts are directed to allow the "curing of any default" under
§ 1322(b)(5). When the debtor retains a property interest under state law
that is not expressly divested by statute, legislative history, or overriding
federal policy, the mandate of the Bankruptcy Code seems clear.
Nevertheless, courts have disallowed the right to cure following
foreclosure sale. Two basic lines of reasoning are followed. First, courts
acknowledge that there is no conflict, otherwise federal law would
prevail.' If federal law applies, then the right to cure would trump the
state requirement of full payment.47 In the absence of a conflict, the right
42. See generallyid. at 1228 (reviewing various approaches in eachjurisdiction and
concluding that beyond the point of acceleration "there is little agreement between the
circuits on when the right to cure ends").
43. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
44. Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 274 (8th Cir. 1983) (quoting Butner
v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012
(1984).
45. In re Thompson, 894 F.2d at 1229.
46. See Burner, 440 U.S. at 55-56.
47. Id. at 54.

NOTE
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to redeem under state law may be exercised, but the mortgagee may not
benefit from the federal "cure" right." Although these courts preserve
the Butner49 rule that property interests are defined by state law in the
absence of a conflict with a federal interest,' the courts do not allow a
debtor to "cure" during a state redemption period." Second, the courts
use state property law definitions to work a change in the
mortgagor-mortgagee relationship following the sale, which defines away
and extinguishes the ability to "cure" any "default."52 These approaches
will be discussed seriatim in recent cases.

IV.

REcENT CASES ADDRESSING THE RIGHT TO CURE

PREPETnTON FORECLOSURE SALES UNDER § 1322(B)(5)
Due to congressional silence, the Sixth Circuit in 1985 recognized the
difficulty in determining when a debtor is entitled to "cure" under § 1322
in In re Glenn.53 The case consolidated three debtor petitions and dealt
with "the point in the foreclosure process at which a Chapter 13 debtor
loses the right to cure a default on a real estate mortgage on his principal
residence."' In the second case of the trilogy, Ralph Miller filed a
petition after the sale of the property but prior to the expiration of the
statutory redemption period.55 The District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan reversed the bankruptcy court decision and permitted Miller
to set aside the foreclosure sale, pay the arrearage, and reinstate the
mortgage.' The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the right to cure a
default ceases upon sale of the property.'
The Sixth Circuit reviewed five positions held by courts in the various
circuits that had addressed the timing of mortgage cure.58 The relevant
48. See infra text accompanying notes 154-78.
49. Butner, 440 U.S. at 48.
50. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
51. Id.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 67-69, 71, 81-83, 104-07.
53. 760 F.2d 1428, 1432 (6th Cir. 1985).
54. Id. at 1429.
55. Id. at 1430-31.
56. Id. at 1431.
57. See id. at 1442.
58. See id. at 1432. The five categories are:
(1) courts that hold that a debtor may not cure a default once a mortgage debt
has been accelerated[;] (2) courts that hold that a debtor may cure a default
where the mortgage debt has been accelerated provided that no foreclosure
judgment has been entered[;] (3) courts [that] hold that a debtor may cure a
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points along the default spectrum were acceleration, foreclosure judgment,
sale, and expiration of state redemption rights." Judge Engel concluded
that, in the absence of congressional direction with respect to acceleration,
judgment, or sale, "the statute itself provides no clear cut-off point except
that which the courts may see fit to create." 60
Judge Engel used this as a springboard from which to formulate a
balancing of equities between lenders and borrowers.61 By finding license
to "create" the foreclosure sale as the clear cut-off, the court readily
admitted that "we avoid any effort to analyze the transaction in terms of
state property law." 62 The court ignored the basic premise that state law
governs in the absence of a federal mandate, preferring to sidestep the
labyrinth of title, lien, or merger doctrines that applying state law
required.6
In a recent bankruptcy case in the First Circuit, In re Tucker,' the
court relied on Glenn toprovide a debtor with the power to cure following
foreclosure judgment.
The case involved a petition following
foreclosure judgment but prior to sale in Maine, which allows a ninety-day
period of redemption.' The bank relied on the argument that the state
merger law reduced the mortgage and note to a judgment, which left the
debtor nothing to cure.67
Judge Goodman in Tucker agreed with the Glenn analysis, without
remark, but went further: "While a state law is certainly relevant, it
simply dictates what property rights and interests a debtor holds. Despite
the doctrine of merger, state law still provides the debtor sufficient
property rights in order to confer upon this court the jurisdiction to
determine the bankruptcy issue regarding those rights." 6'
default where a state court judgment of foreclosure has been entered provided
that no sale has taken place[;] (4) courts that place no express limitation on the
debtor's right to cure a default after acceleration [; and] (5) courts that hold
that a debtor may cure a default where a foreclosure sale has been held
provided that the debtor's right of redemption under state law has not expired.

Id. (citations omitted).
59. See id.

60. Id. at 1435 (emphasis added).
61. See id.

62. Id. at 1436.
63. See id.

64. 131 B.R. 245 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991).
65.
66.
67.
68.

See id. at 245.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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In reviewing the Tucker reasoning, it is clear that if state law indeed
"dictates" property rights, as Tucker states, it follows that a debtor with
a statutory redemption right has state-based property rights. In the case
of a statutory right of redemption, the theory that this right is eliminated
at judgment and merger negates the very existence of the right. It is a
mere tautology to grant a post-foreclosure right that is merged out of
existence at judgment. Rather, the mortgagor's property interest is left
intact if the state provides a grace period after a sale in which the property
can be redeemed.
With this property right as the starting point, the debtor filing a
Chapter 13 petition has some "legal or equitable interest" in which to
apply the "cure" power.' In the states that do not have a statutory right
of redemption, no state-defined property interests exist after the
foreclosure sale, and the Bankruptcy Code does not recreate interests that
have expired or did not exist at filing. 70 This approach attempts to
eliminate the property interest itself by redefining it out of existence after
filing. But if the state right exists before filing, it is a valid property
interest upon which the Bankruptcy Code may operate.
Judge Goodman's position in Tucker recognized the primacy of the
Code's right to cure, yet found that it did not apply under the state's
merger law. 7' He supported his position by misusing the often-quoted
language from In re Taddeo to support the statement that a Chapter 13
debtor has a right to cure controlled by the Bankruptcy Code, not state
law: "We do not believe that Congress labored for five years over this
controversial question only to remit consumer debtors-intended to be the
primary beneficiaries of the new code-to the harsher mercies of state
law."'
The Taddeo court was concerned with the effect of disallowing
deceleration by the use of an acceleration clause in a mortgage agreement
under Chapter 13.1 If lenders were able to include an acceleration clause
in a note that could ipso facto defeat the benefits of a Chapter 13 filing,
debtors would as a matter of course be subject to standard acceleration
69. The broad sweep of § 541 brings in all "legal and equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencementof the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541. Also, § 1306
expressly incorporates § 541, and brings § 1322 to bear upon a default on a debtor
interest in her principal residence. See id. § 1306.
70. See In re Thompson, 894 F.2d 1227, 1229 (10th Cir. 1990) ("No court has held
that debtors can use the bankruptcy cure provisions to recover property in which they no
longer have any interest under state law.").
71. In re Tucker, 131 B.R. at 245.
72. 685 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1985).
73. In re Tucker, 131 B.R. at 245.
74. In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 28.
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Such a holding would indeed leave debtors to the "harsher

mercies" of state law, without the "cure" remedy made available by

Congress under the Bankruptcy Code.76 If state law dictates property

rights and interests, and the Bankruptcy Code controls the right to cure,
it is a simple syllogism to preserve a state statutory right to redeem to

allow a "cure" under the Bankruptcy Code. This avoids the harsh effect
of losing the homestead that is capable of cure under the Bankruptcy
Code.
In effect, the Third and Eighth Circuits applied state definitions of

mortgage and judgment' and discovered that state law can be applied to
defeat a federal entitlement that, in the absence of a bankruptcy petition,
would have been a state-law entitlement. 7"

The Eighth Circuit decided a Chapter 12 petition in Justice v. Valley

National Bani99 by construing the post-foreclosure sale right to cure
under § 1322.0 The principal rationale applied to remove the right to

cure from the debtor was that the foreclosure sale extinguished the
mortgage contract and worked a substantial change in the relationship of
the parties under state law."' "The restriction in § 1322(b)(2) refers to

claims 'secured only by a security interest,' but in this case the foreclosure
judgment and sale extinguished Prudential's security interest."' The
court then focused on what would be a modification of a state court
75. See id.
76. See In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370, 1377 (3d Cir. 1987) ("Given the availability
and prevalence of automatic acceleration clauses, if section 1322(b)(5) is found to be
available only before acceleration, it will be virtually meaningless in the home mortgage
context."); see also In re Thompson, 894 F.2d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 1990) (Badlock,
J., concurring in judgment only) ("[A]ny application of state law is impermissible where
such law confficts with a federal statute, its legislative history, or an underlying federal
interest. ").
77. See, e.g., Justice v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 849 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir. 1988). The
court gently disagreed with the Glenn court's solution to the timing problem, finding that
"in light of our analysis of the state and federal interests implicated in this area, we
believe that Congress' silence is better interpreted as evidence of its intent to leave state
law undisturbed." Id. at 1088 n.10.
78. See infra notes 79-126 and accompanying text.
79. 849 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir. 1988).
80. Id. at 1081-83. Unlike § 1222(b)(2), § 1322(b)(2) prohibits modification of the
rights of a holder of a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that
serves as the principal residence of the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322. "Nor can we
ignore the fact that the relevant provisions of section[ ] 1222(b)... (5) [is] identical to
those found in section 1322." Justice, 849 F.2d at 1086.
81. Justice, 849 F.2d at 1085.
82. Id. at 1083.
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judgment and found no support for the proposition that Congress had
intended this result.
The search for this congressional support became the strawman.
"Nothing in the language or history of subsection (2) or its predecessors
suggests that Congress intended the provision to be used for that
purpose .... Moreover, where Congress elsewhere intended bankruptcy
courts to intrude in state judicial proceedings, it explicitly directed them
to do so, using unambiguous language. " "
The search was fruitless, however, because Congress was not
concerned with state mortgage and foreclosure regulations. Using the
court's logic, if Congress meant to limit the right, Congress would have
unambiguously determined a point in the state court procedures after
which the right to cure would no longer exist.
The court acknowledged the general principle that state laws are
suspended only to the extent of actual conflict with the federal bankruptcy
system.' The court also acknowledged that when no conflict exists, unless
some federal interest requires a different result, the law of the state where
the property is situated governs property rights.8 The court did not find
any actual conflict between § 1222 and a South Dakota law that required
an override of the state redemption laws." Applying the state law, the
court, following Roach, determined that "cure" and "default" refer to
contractual relationships and that under South Dakota law the contractual
relationship ends when the property is sold to a third party.88
The Justice court briefly addressed the preemption argument that the
Bankruptcy Code establishes a federal common law covering the "right to
cure."' The court, however, was unwilling to decide that issue: "We
need not decide today whether the right to cure under § 1222(b)(3), (b)(5)
is a federal right, because we are satisfied that even if it is, state law
should be adopted in these circumstances as the federal rule of
decision."'
The dissent in Justice provided the common-sense response to this
hypertechnical reading of Butner-that the application of state law would
require the debtor to modify impermissibly a state court judgment
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 1087.

86. Id.
87. See id. at 1088.
88. See id. at 1087.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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following sale. 9' Judge Heaney recognized that state court judgments
must yield to a right granted under the Bankruptcy Code.Y "Yet, to the

extent the judgment conflicts with specific rights granted the debtor under
the Bankruptcy Code, contrary provisions of the state court judgment must
give way."9
The property rights under state law are sacred only to the extent of
their creation, but not to their full application. 4 If a right exists under
state law, the Bankruptcy Code often modifies the state right, unless

expressly preserved under federal law.' Because a judgment is a statecreated right, the modification of a foreclosure judgment is not denied
under the Bankruptcy Code but is merely preserved following petition for
possible modification.'

Judge Heaney also rejected the majority's definitions of "cure" and
"default" as presupposing a contractual relationship. Again, he used
common sense:

Yet, the language of section 1222(b)(5) does not limit the right to
cure to those debts arising out of an existing contractual

relationship. One would think that if Congress had been aware of
such an important distinction, it would have clearly expressed its
intention to limit the debtor's right to cure a default to a time
before acceleration, judgment, or sale. It did not. I see no reason

for the Court to impose a limitation on the right to cure that is not
supposed by the broad language of section 1222(b)(5). 9
The same analysis applies to § 1322(b)(5) with equal force.
91. Id. at 1088-89 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
92. See id. at 1089.
93. Id.
94. The basic premise expressed in Butner is that state law creates and defines the
property interest held by the debtor, and that state laws are suspended only to the extent
of an actual conflict with the bankruptcy provisions. See Butner v. United States, 440
U.S. 48, 54 (1979). Referring to the Bankruptcy Act, the Court held that certain
provisions invalidate interests as fraudulent or preferences, but "Congress has generally
left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law."
Id. The Code should not provide more to a debtor as far as substantive property interests
than the debtor otherwise has outside of the protection of the bankruptcy court. See id.
at 55.
95. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
96. Justice, 849 F.2d at 1089 (Heaney, J., dissenting) ("Much of the Bankruptcy
Code involves modification of state created property rights. Such modifications are not
prohibited merely becausethe rights involved are embodied in a state court judgment.").
97. Id. at 1090.
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One purpose behind Chapter 13 is to benefit homeowners." This
purpose is furthered by a broad reading of § 1322(b)(5)-"[t]he plan may
...provide for the curing of any default, "-not the tortured interpretation
of contract-based state remedies neither addressed by Congress nor the
language of § 1322(b)(5).
In In re Roach,"® the Third Circuit faced a Chapter 13 filing after
the sale but prior to the expiration of the state statutory period.1 The
Roach court flatly disagreed with the Glenn cutoff designation. 2 Judge
Stapleton focused on the importance of state sovereignty, citing Butner for
the principle that "the basic federal rule is that state law governs. "I
The court followed New Jersey law, holding that the right to cure
terminates once a foreclosure judgment is entered. a' Under state law,
the mortgage merges into the judgment and ceases to exist, and no
mortgage exists at petition to be cured under the Bankruptcy Code."
After the entry of a foreclosure judgment, "no contractual relationship
remains."" The court concluded that "beyond that point in the
foreclosure process there are no substantial federal interests that would
justify ignoring property interests created by the judgment of a New Jersey
Court. "107

Judge Stapleton acknowledged in small measure that the purposes of
Chapter 13 are not furthered by this pro-lender stance. 11 The
termination of the right of cure at the entry of foreclosure judgment,
however, "does not significantly threaten the interests that Chapter 13 was
designed to protect."1 "7
Although the Glenn court created substantive law based on equity by
ignoring state law,110 the Roach court slavishly adhered to state law,
98. See supratext accompanying notes 31-34.
99. See supratext accompanying notes 35-39.
100. 824 F.2d 1370 (3d Cir. 1987).
101. See id. at 1371.
102. Id. at 1373 ("[Our] conclusion conflicts with the position of the Sixth Circuit
that the right to cure defaults on residential property'in every state survives until a
foreclosure sale is held.").
103. Id. at 1374.
104. See id. at 1379.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 1377.

107.
108.
109.
110.

id.
See id. at 1378.
Id. (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying notes 53-63.
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as did the Seventh Circuit in In re Clark."' By redefining the
relationships held by the parties under state law, these courts were able to
circumvent the application of the federal right to cure "any default.""'
Neither the Roach nor Glenn courts balanced state and federal
entitlements. These courts, at each end of the spectrum, deny the federal
right to cure to parties holding a valid state-law redemption right." 3
Recently, the Third Circuit in First National Fidelity Corp. v.
Perry, 4 continued its strict reading of the right to cure any default."1
The court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not preempt a New Jersey
creditor's state-law right to immediate payment of the foreclosure
judgment following default.116 The court reaffirmed Roach:
Since the change which the Roaches' plan sought to make in the
rights of their home mortgage lender was not a "cure" within the
meaning of section 1322(b)(5) and since section 1322(b)(2)
prohibited any material alteration in the rights of such a lender
other than those affected in a "cure," we found no federal
authorization for preempting the state rights created upon the
entry of the foreclosure judgment.' 7
The focus in the Third Circuit is creditor protection. The logic that
extinguished the "mortgage" and replaced it with the "judgment"-a
noncurable entity-runs into difficulty when the use of the "judgment"
comes into collision with the definition of "security interest." 1 8 Under
§ 1322(b)(2), secured claims can be modified, other than a claim secured
"by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal
residence."119 The court seems to be contending that a debtor's mortgage
111. 738 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding that transfer of title determines cutoff
point for the right to cure under § 1322(b)(5)).
112. See infra notes 190-93.
113. In re Roach, 824 F.2d at 1373 ("[Section] 1322(b) must be read in the context
of state law and that its right to cure a default on a mortgage on a home located in New
Jersey terminates upon entry of foreclosure judgment."); In re Glenn, 760 F.2d at 1436
("WIln construing this federal statute, we think it unnecessary to justify our construction
by holding that the sale 'extinguishes' or 'satisfies' the mortgage of the lien, or that the
mortgage is somehow 'merged' in the judgment or in the deed of sale under state law.").
114. 945 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1991).
115. See id.
116. See id. at 62.

117. Id. at 63.
118. See id. at 64, 66.
119. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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is extinguished at judgment, but the lender's security interest survives

judgment to prevent modification. "We hold that a New Jersey home
mortgage lender retains a security interest for the purpose of § 1322(b)(2)
following the entry of foreclosure judgment.""
The Perry court recognized the reality that foreclosure is "an inherent
part of the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship" when upholding the
lender's interest."' But, the court did not allow modification of a
judgment because the court is "confident that Congress must have had this
fact in mind when it sought to provide special assurance to home mortgage
lenders that their expectations would not be frustrated." 1
Because the judgment has been entered, the debtors in New Jersey
cannot be restored to predefault status under the right to cure."
Lenders' prepetition security interests are protected against modification
after entry of judgment, but debtors' prepetition rights of redemption are
not, leaving them without the remedy that Chapter 13 was designed to
provide them-to cure any default."
The Perry court recognized the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship
even after that relationship was reduced to judgment, in the context of a
secured creditor's right to full and immediate payment."z The court did
not acknowledge, though, the reality of the ongoing mortgagor-mortgagee
relationship for the purpose of recognizing the debtor's continuing interest
in the property to reinstate her predefault status."
In another recent case, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in the Ninth
Circuit ruled that a prepetition foreclosure sale cannot be cured." z In re
Braker1" disapproved of the well-reasoned minority position by the
District of Oregon Bankruptcy Court in In re Ivory.1"
In Ivory, the lender, the Department of Veterans Affairs, opposed a
cure in the debtor's plan that consisted of a lump-sum payment from
120. Perry, 945 F.2d at 61. But see In re Ivory, 32 B.R. 788 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983)
("To be consistent with the intent of Congress to provide special protection to home
mortgages, a foreclosure judgment should retain the character of a 'security interest' or
lien created by an agreement and therefor [sic] not a lien which could be modified under
1322(b)(2).").
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Perry, 945 F.2d at 64.
Id.
See id. at 65.
See id. at 64.
See id. at 67.

126. See id.

127. See In re Braker, 125 B.R. 798 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991).

128. Id.
129. 32 B.R. 788 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983).
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insurance proceeds (upon confirmation) and monthly payments for the life
of the plan." The case presented the issue whether a Chapter13113 debtor
can cure a default after a final decree of foreclosure and sale.
Ivory was a case of first impression for the District of Oregon
Bankruptcy Court. 132 The court reviewed the five positions relative to
the timing of mortgage cure in the various jurisdictions, which the Glenn
court reproduced in its decision. 33 Judge Hess provided perhaps the best
and simplest analysis of the prepetition sale, reviewing the state statute for
when legal title passes and applying Bankruptcy Code § 541 to determine
if the debtor retains any interest after the sale."
Under Oregon law, the purchaser at a foreclosure sale receives a
certificate of sale, evidencing a right to possession. 35 Legal title passes
to the purchaser after the one-year statutory right of redemption has
expired and a sheriff's deed is delivered." The debtor, therefore,
retains an interest in the sold property until the statutory redemption
period runs out. 37 By applying the broad reach of Bankruptcy Code
§ 541, the right of redemption becomes property of the estate. 3
Section 541,139 in the absence of any express limitation on
§ 1322(b)(5)'s right to "cure any default," provides a compelling rationale
for the Ivory court's holding. Judge Hess made a simple and logical
conclusion: "The fact that the debtor still retains an interest in the sold
property gives them the right to effect a cure under 11 U.S.C.
1322(b)(5)."140 This approach involves no judicial creation of rights
through equity and no judicial legislating.
The court did not follow the line of cases that deems the entry of a
foreclosure judgment under state law a merger and extinguishment of the
130.
131.
132.
133.

See id. at 789.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 790; supratext accompanying notes 58-59.

134. See In re Ivory, 32 B.R. at 791.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. ("Mhe debtor's right of redemption became property of the estate at
the time of the debtor's filing.").
139. Section 541 reads: "The commencement of a case ... creates an estate. Such
estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by whomever
held: (a) . . . all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541.
140. In re Ivory, 32 B.R. at 791.
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mortgage, leaving nothing for the debtor to cure.14' Judge Hess
determined that state laws that would limit the right to cure did not affect

§ 1332(b)(5), finding that "the Bankruptcy Code establishes its own

redemption design in lieu of state laws."

42

As long as the debtor retains

an interest that becomes property of the estate, the Bankruptcy Code
provides certain rights to the debtor, including the right to cure."

In contrast to the pro-lender position of the Third Circuit, which
found that lenders have state-law rights to full payment unaffected by the

Bankruptcy Code, lenders in Ivory got the appropriate treatment intended
under the Bankruptcy Code: adequate protection.'" Relying on In re

Thompson" the court found that Congress, under the Bankruptcy Act,
did not intend to alter prior case law that determined that "a secured

creditor was not entitled to all rights afforded him under contract terms or
state law, but rather need only have his secured position protected while
the reorganization proceeded. " " In addition, § 1322(b)(5) does not

contain any limitations in its expansive language-"the curing of any
default" 47-or in the legislative history. "If Congress had intended to
limit cure to preacceleration, prejudgment or presale defaults, it could

have done so. It did not."" Again, the underlying purpose of Chapter

13 does not compel a strict reading. 49 Section 1322(b)(5) places a

special emphasis on the preservation of the homestead; a strict reading
runs counter to this goal.'5
141. See id. at 790-92. The court used the analysis starting with property of the
estate under section 541. See id. at 791
142. Id. at 791; see also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 32, 1322.09[2]
(describing the scope of the Code's reach as to long-term debts the debtor is unwilling
or unable to pay during the terms of the plan).
143. See In re Ivory, 32 B.R. at 792 ("Had Congress intended state laws limiting
cure to apply, section 1322(b) would have been unnecessary.").
144. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (allowing a party in interest to make a motion to
lift the automatic stay in order to obtain possession of the security if the party is not
provided adequate protection of his or her interest in the security); id. § 361 (1988)
(prescribing three methods by which secured lenders can be provided adequate
protection, including granting the indubitable equivalent of his or her interest in the

security).
145. 17 B.R. 748 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1982).
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

In re Ivory, 32 B.R. at 791-92 (quoting In re Thompson, 17 B.R. at 752).
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (emphasis added).
In re Ivory, 32 B.R. at 792.
See id.
See id.
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In the absence of a clear federal mandate regarding timing, state law
governs the creation and interest in property."' The operation of the
state mortgage and foreclosure laws, though, has been used by the Third
and Eighth Circuits to limit the scope of the federal right to cure under
§ 1322(b)(5).152 Is this a conflict, or were limitations on the right to cure
implicitly built into § 1322(b)(5), although the language of that section
does not contain any express limitations? Do the courts require
authorization to apply federal law in the absence of express limitations or
to apply state law when the Bankruptcy Code is silent? 15 3 The question
becomes: Is there a real conflict when state law limits the scope of the
federal cure power, which is not expressly limited?
The most satisfactory response is that silence does not mean that
limitations on the right to cure exist. There are numerous examples in
which the Bankruptcy Code allows non-bankruptcy law to apply." If
the language or legislative record reveals no intention to limit bankruptcy
powers, and underlying bankruptcy policy favors a broad application,
Congress must have intended the right to cure to apply when a state-based
property interest properly comes under the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court.15 In this way, a proper balance between state-created property
interests and the federal intervention is struck with that interest embodied
in the "cure" right.
The Ivory court's holding that all the steps following default until the
final divestment of the debtor's interest may be cured under § 1322(b)(5)
was effectively overruled by the Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit in
the 1991 decision In re Braker.I The court held that a prepetition
foreclosure sale prevented the application of § 1322(b)(5) to cure the
default." The Department of Veterans Affairs was again the lender.
Following default, a decree of foreclosure and writ of execution were
151. See supra notes 43-44.

152. See supra notes 79-126 and accompanying text.
153. See In re Ivory, 32 B.R. at 792 ("These courts reason that express authority
is required to negate the application of state law and void state court judgments.").
154. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (allowing states to opt out of federal exemption
scheme); id. § 544(b) (allowing a trustee to use state fraudulent-conveyancestatute under
the strong-arm power).
155. This is a deduction based on the discussion in Ivory and throughout this paper.
See In re Ivory, 32 B.R. at 788.
156. 125 B.R. 798 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991). For a recent analysis of Braker and of
the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of § 1322(b)(3) and (5) see In re Hurt, 158 B.R. 154,
158-60 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the right to cure under § 1322(b)(5) is cutoff

at the foreclosure sale).
157. See id. at 801.
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issued."' Two days after the Braker property was sold, the Chapter 13
petition was filed. The plan was confirmed allowing a cure through
and during
the life of the plan. " The lower court relied on the Ivory
161
decision.
Judge Ollason, in the first paragraph of the short opinion,
acknowledged § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, stating that the 180-day
Oregon statutory period for redemption is either a legal or equitable right
held by the debtor." The court also recognized the Ivory distinction that

state laws that limit the federal right to cure must yield to the Bankruptcy
Code. 1 Without distinguishing Ivory, the court disapproved of it and
proceeded to cite the line of cases that rely on state real-property
procedure law." The court declined to adopt the § 541 reasoning,
which applies the right to cure under § 1322(b)(5) to the debtor's statutory
interest in the sold property." Instead, the court adopted state law in
toto, arguing that an Oregon decree of foreclosure extinguishes the

mortgage contract, and played the state-law definitional game."

"To

have a cure, there must be a default, and to have a default, there must be
a contract." 67 By adopting state law, the court limited the scope of the

right to cure, which is in direct conflict with the language of § 1322(b)(5).

158. Id. at 799.
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 800.
164. See id.; see also In re Mann Farms, Inc., 917 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1990)
(stating the right of the debtor, trustee, or other estate representative to pursue, retain,
or enforce any cause of action at the time the petition was filed); Justice v. Valley Nat'l
Bank, 849 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that sections of Chapter 12 do not authorize
the extension of state redemption periods); In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370 (3d Cir. 1987)
(upholding state-law time limits of debtor's right to cure home mortgage default); In re
Tynan, 773 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that the automatic stay provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code do not toll the running of state statutory redemption periods); In re
Glenn, 760 F.2d 1428 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 849 (1985) (holding that
foreclosure sale extinguishes debtor's right to cure default and reinstate mortgage, and
that automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not toll or extend running of
state statutory periods of redemption after a foreclosure sale).
165. See In re Braker, 125 B.R. at 801.
166. See id. at 800-01 ("The circuit courts concluded that the curing of a default
under 11 U.S.C. section 1322(b)(5) requires an existing contractual relationship.").
167. Id. at 801.
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The Bankruptcy Code cannot create an interest that has expired under
state law prior to a bankruptcy petition.'" The Braker court's reliance
on In re Seidel," therefore, was inapposite because the case dealt with
a prepetition matured debt in the absence of an acceleration clause.' 70
The statutory period in Braker had not yet expired.' No circuit has
argued yet for a post-sale cure when the state does not provide a statutory
right of redemption."
By ignoring the reality of the continuing mortgagor-mortgagee
relationship, and by ignoring its own opening paragraph focusing on the
legal interest of the debtor in the property under § 541, the Braker court
determined that allowing a postsale cure would "create new rights for the
debtors while taking vested rights from the DVA [Department of Veterans
Affairs]. " rs The focus became skewed. Is the court taking away
property rights from the creditor or from the debtor?
The court acknowledged a prepetition § 541 legal or equitable interest
in the property in the debtor. 74 The court also acknowledged that the
§ 1322(b)(5) right to cure gives the parties "the equivalent of their state
law rights."" 7 Oregon law gives the debtor 180 days to redeem the
property following sale. 76 The Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor to
cure "any default" in the home mortgage."7 The Oregon statute allows
the debtor to redeem after the foreclosure decree, yet the Appellate Panel
interpreted the Bankruptcy Code as not allowing the debtor to take that
redemption power and apply the § 1322(b)(5) right to cure to it.' 78 In
state court, redemption privileges are provided, but in bankruptcy court,
the redemption cure is denied. This result should not be.
168. This runs counter to the express limitation in § 541, bringing into the estate

all "legal and equitable" interests of the debtor, but not ones after which a legal or
equitable interest in the debtor has expired prior to the petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 541.
169. 752 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1985).
170. See In re Braker, 125 B.R. at 801.
171. See id. at 799.
172. See In re Thompson, 894 F.2d 1227, 1229 (10th Cir. 1990) ("No Court has
held that debtors can use the bankruptcy cure provisions to recover property in which
they no longer have any interest under state law.").
173. See In re Braker, 125 B.R. at 801.
174. See id. at 799.
175. Id. at 801.
176. Id. at 800.
177. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5).
178. See In re Braker, 125 B.R. at 801.
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Judge Ollason explained that under Oregon law, redemption cannot
revive the mortgage, but can only pay the debt. 19 The debtor can pay
the debt in full and keep the home, but cannot keep the mortgage in place.
The new relationships following this decree are that "the DVA has a
judgment arising from a judicial mortgage foreclosure, and debtors have
a claim against the DVA based on their statutory redemption rights."180
So, application of state law, without a conflict with the federal right to
cure, leaves the debtor with only the right to pay in full.
But the analysis must be pushed further. Indeed, under state law, the
presale equitable right of redemption allows the debtor to pay the amount
in full to salvage the homestead."' Established bankruptcy practice
recognizes that, as an alternative to losing their homes due to financial
insolvency, qualifying debtors may file a petition for protection under
Chapter 13.18 The all-important § 1322(b)(5) right to cure "any default"
allows the homeowner to reverse the default-and-foreclosure process, in
effect, keeping the mortgage on foot." Section 1322(b)(5) gives the
power to the debtor to decelerate, reinstate, and keep the
mortgagor-mortgagee relationship in place, state law notwithstanding.1 4
Yet, the court explained that, after sale, the state-law principle of merger
trumps the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship and cure right, and makes
revival of the mortgage impossible.", s
Although the debtor retains the right to regain possession of the
property, the court would prefer to make that right incurable and
essentially impossible to exercise." Certainly, if the estate were capable
of paying the full amount, there would be no need for an estate in the first
place and no need for a Chapter 13 filing to save the homestead, which,
under this interpretation, could not be cured and saved anyway. 1 As
179. See id.
180. Id.
181. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 15, at 478.
182. See suprapart m.B.
183. See id.
184. See id; see also David J. Oliveiri, Annotation, Right of Debtor to "DeAcceleration" of Residential Mortgage Indebtedness Under Chapter 13 of Bankruptcy
Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C.S. § 1332(b)), 67 A.L.R. FED. 217 (1984 & Supp. 1989).
185. See In re Braker, 125 B.R. at 801.
186. See id.
187. The homeowner-debtor defaults on her loan payments and the home is
foreclosed and sold at auction. The statutory right of redemption under state law allows
her to regain possession, but at the cost of the principal amount of debt plus costs, a
substantial amount of money considering the homeowner-debtor was unable to continue
timely payments on the debt. See AXELROD Er AL., supra note 21, at 297. By
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the Taddeo court recognized, requiring the debtor to pay the amount in
full, as provided by state law, leaves the debtor with a severely limited
right to cure." m There is no legislative or policy support for the Braker
court's tortured interpretation. 1"
In the Tenth Circuit case, In re Thompson, 1 Judge Logan properly
recognized that delimiting the § 1322(b) right to cure, which has no
express time limitation, "determines the deadline by which debtors must
file a bankruptcy petition in order to avail themselves of the bankruptcy
cure provisions. " "" One must ask whether a deadline of such
importance would have not been specified by Congress had it thought to
establish one in derogation of state law.
Judge Logan wrestled with the problem left by the Roach, Clark, and
Justice courts. These courts, among others" characterized by Logan as
"state law" courts, were unable to interpret and apply state mortgage and
foreclosure law and the right to cure in a consistent manner. 19
interpreting § 1322(b)(5) as leaving undisturbed the operation of the state right to
redeem, but without the federal right to cure, the scope of the state right effectively
wipes out the debtor's ability to reorganize and clearly impinges on the Bankruptcy
Code's sphere of operation. So, it is a strange interpretation that preserves the Burner
recognition of the scope of state property interests, but to the extent that the right to cure
is effectively emasculated. This is another way of arguing that there is no conflict
between the two spheres-state and federal. There is no conflict only if the Bankruptcy
Code right to cure is interpreted out of existence by using state-based definitions and
regulations, such as judgment and merger. See supratext accompanying notes 67-69, 71,
81-83, 104-07.
188. See In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[Blecause she can
accelerate her mortgage under state law, the Taddeos can cure only as provided by state
law. This interpretation of § 1322(b) would leave the debtor with fewer rights under the
new Bankruptcy Code than under the old Bankruptcy Act of 1898.").
189. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
190. 894 F.2d 1227 (10th Cir. 1990).
191. Id. at 1228.
192. See, e.g., In re Schnupp, 64 B.R. 763 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1986) (title passes at
end of statutory redemption period); In re Tynan, 773 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985) (title
passes at date of foreclosure judgment).
193. In re Thompson, 894 F.2d at 1229 ("The courts that purport merely to apply
state law have themselves had difficulty fitting state mortgage and foreclosure concepts
to the bankruptcy power to cure."). The Thompson court reviewed the "state court"
inconsistencies. See id. First, it described how In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370 (3d Cir.
1987), ended the right to cure at judgment even though the mortgagee possessed
independent rights by virtue of its judgment. See In re Thompson, 894 F.2d at 1229.
Second, it described how In re Clark, 738 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1984), allowed cure
following judgment because title did not pass until foreclosure sale. See In re Thompson,
894 F.2d at 1229. Finally, it described how Justice v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 849 F.2d 1078
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NOTE

As in the Ivory decision, the proper approach, applied by the
Thompson court following a bankruptcy petition, began with the concept
of property of the estate under Bankruptcy Code § 541." "The
Bankruptcy Code... settled on an expanded concept encompassing any
interest under state law, legal or equitable."'95
Judge Logan was concerned by the introduction of a third par into
the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship-the good faith purchaser.1 "We
hesitate to further cloud the interests and expectations of a third-party
purchaser through an expansive right of bankruptcy cure." 1 7 The
purpose of the statutory right of redemption, ostensibly, is to bring a fair
price at sale, while the equitable right of redemption provides additional
time to secure new financing."' Based on these factors, the Thompson
court determined that the foreclosure sale was the point at which to end
the right to cure in bankruptcy."
Nevertheless, Judge Logan distinguished Thompson on its facts and
effectively ruled that beyond equitable considerations of third-party
purchasers, statutory rights in the debtor are curable.'
We do not have before us and do not now decide whether the
right to cure should continue during a state's extended statutory
redemption period when the mortgagee purchases at the
foreclosure sale. Often the mortgagee will purchase the property
by bidding in the amount of the mortgage debt. In such a case,
the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship is essentially unchanged by
the foreclosure sale, and an argument can be made that the right
of bankruptcy cure should last until the end of any statutory
redemption period state law would allow."'
(8th Cir. 1988), did not allow postsale cure because it interpreted a Congressional intent
not to allow cure once the mortgage contract was ended. See In re Thompson, 894 F.2d
at 1229. The Thompson court concluded that "it is often hard to determine exactly which
state law event these courts consider to be controlling." Id.
194. See In re Thompson, 894 F.2d at 1229.
195. Id.; see also 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPIrCY, supra note 32,
541.02[1]
(outlining "the substantial departure under the Code from the extensive reliance of the
Bankruptcy Act on nonbankruptcy law.., to determine what property will come into

the estate").
196. See In re Thompson, 894 F.2d at 1230.

197. Id.
198. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
199. See In re Thompson, 894 F.2d at 1230.
200. See id.
201. Id. at 1230 n.6 (emphasis partially added) (citation omitted).
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The concurrence in the Thompson case highlighted the majority's
acknowledgment that the statute's language and legislative history did not
put a time limitation on the exercise of the right to cure and that the court
was acting on the basis of equitable consideration.' The concurrence
had considerable difficulty with the circuitous reasoning of previous courts
that have slavishly applied mind-bending state mortgage laws but blinded
themselves to a simple application of the right to cure.' "Oddly
enough, the court is willing to discuss the mortgage redemption laws of
the fifty states to justify its result, but declines to address the problem of
whether the right to cure should continue during a state's statutory
redemption period when the . . . mortgagor-mortgagee relationship is

essentially unchanged."'
In the serial petition case, In re Saylors,' the Eleventh Circuit
addressed the parties' respective rights to the petitioner's home.'
Foreshadowing how the Court would rule in the prepetition sale case,
Judge Vance recognized that "[t]he Alabama statutory right of redemption
is a property right of the debtor within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court."' Two years later, in April 1991, the Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Alabama was presented with this precise situation in
In re Dickerson. 8 The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae) foreclosed on a mortgage at public auction, followed four days later
by a Chapter 13 filing.' The Dickerson court relied on Saylors to find
that the statutory right of redemption brought the disputed property into
the bankruptcy estate.210 Without elaboration, the court read § 1322(b)
as allowing the debtor to propose a plan that may cure any default.
The definition of "cure," based on the Second Circuit Taddeo decision,
allowed deceleration and reinstatement of the payment schedule. 1
What appears to be a simple analysis for many bankruptcy courts, but
more involved at the appellate and circuit level, will be a matter of first
impression for the Eleventh Circuit when it faces this issue. Based on the
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See id. at 1231 (Baldock, J., concurring).
See id. at 1232-33.
Id. at 1233.
869 F.2d 1434 (11th Cir. 1989).
See id. at 1435.
Id. at 1437.
13b B.R. 110 (Bahkr. S.D. Ala. 1991).
Id. at 111-12.
See id. at 112 (citing In re Saylors, 869 F.2d at 1437).
See id.
See id.
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Saylors analysis, it is likely the court will recognize that a debtor's state
court right to redeem, when brought under the Bankruptcy Code, is
curable.
V. CONCLUSION

State property law determines the interests held by the debtor in
property at the time of the filing of a bankruptcy petition." 3 Once the
bankruptcy court obtains jurisdiction, the Bankruptcy Code provides
certain rights to the debtor, among them, the right to cure any default
under § 1322(b)(5). 4 In a majority of states, the statutory right of
redemption is a property right, which debtors retain following the
foreclosure sale of their property.2 15 This interest in their property
becomes part of the bankruptcy estate under § 541 and is therefore eligible
for the cure right under Chapter 13.216
The courts cited in this note recognize the importance of applying
state property law in bankruptcy. 1 7 But instead of using state law to
determine the inception and creation of the interest in property, state law
is applied in toto. By doing so, state law limits the scope of the federal
right to cure, which has no explicit point after which the right may not be
exercised. Once the state merger and foreclosure law impinges on the
Bankruptcy Code's right to cure, the Bankruptcy Code must prevail.2 18
In addition, by allowing the redemption right to survive, but not allowing
the right to cure to apply, the courts use state-based definitions to limit the
219
application of the cure right that Congress did not intend to limit.
Again, state law is used to limit the scope of the cure right and is
therefore impermissible.
The statutory right of redemption should be given the same weight as
preforeclosure sale property rights and the debtor given the full scope of
the Bankruptcy Code right to cure any default and reinstate the mortgage
to predefault status.

Gary A. Saunders
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See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
See supra text accompanying notes 32-39.
See supra text accompanying note 19.
See supra text accompanying notes 138-39.
See supra part IV.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
See, e.g., In re Ivory, 32 B.R. 788, 792 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983) ("Had Congress
state laws limiting cure to apply, § 1322(b) would have been unnecessary.").

